repression, as manifested in the aftermath of the so-called 'Jasmine Revolution' and the imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo in 2009; and partly due to the rising opportunity of rightsbased social and legal advocacy, as demonstrated by the popular weiquan (rights defending) movement. There is an increasing convergence between a right protection movement and the dissidence movement in that political dissent is increasingly embedded in and expressed through protecting social and economic rights. Dissidents have toned down their political rhetoric and are engaged in lower-risk ordinary social and economic issues, aiming at incremental political change through socio-legal advocacy.
Dissidents are now concerned primarily with the rights of migrants, underground churchgoers; petitioners and the broadly-defined vulnerable groups.
Earlier generations of dissidents challenged the Party by setting up opposition parties but the new generation tries to mould and change the system through legal and constitutional reform. As Feng notes, dissent is now more embedded, rooted and become part of a larger rights movement, and both forces increasingly find themselves in a 'grand coalition of liberal forces' and use laws and mechanism associated with legal rights to tame, mould and change the political system. 3 Dissidents are reaching out to and joining forces with the vibrant social forces, with a clear objective to use social justice and social and economic rights as an entry point for a political change. Routine protests for social and economic rights have become better organized and more forceful, and are developing some vaguely framed political objectives. Social and economic issues are drawing the attention, sympathy, support and participation of people from different walks of life and the accumulative force is presenting a unique challenge to the Party's political stability and legitimacy.
There are quantitative and qualitative changes in protest. It is well-known that nowadays, protest happens more frequently, is much larger in scale when it happens, and has better organization and coordination. Large-scale protests are no longer limited to more remote areas such as Weng'an or Shishou. They are taking place in the coastal regions at the heart of China's export centres such as Jiangsu and Guangdong. Protesters represent a cross section of Chinese society and they protest against a diverse range of social and economic problems, such as labour conditions, environment degradation, poverty and corruption. Together they represent the broadly based bottom-up social mobilization with different degrees of legality, effectiveness and resilience.
Researchers have identified several qualitative changes in social protest in China and indicated a strong degree of politicization. Traditional social justice issues are increasingly framed in political terms and mass events in general have become much more politically informed and politically relevant. First of all, a collective identity is clearly emerging through the collective action. 4 Armed with legal rights and a strongly and agree to a common course of action against common adversaries through coordinated action. 5 The development of a common course and identity draws a larger number of people to the protest and creates a critical mass of protesters which in turn reduce the fear of participation and make the protest more sustainable. The growth in size and the development of common identity also necessitates better planning and coordination. As it happens, protesters have used information technology effectively in mobilization and have designed strategies to minimize and counter potential police suppression. government is directly involved and held responsible. In land appropriation, the government benefits from land sales and often manipulates transactions from behind; in labour protests, the government restricts collective action, breaks up strikes and detains labour leaders; and in social welfare claims, the government is to blame for the failure to pay.
Thirdly, protesters are moving beyond their diverse individual grievances and have started to look into the political structure for remedies. The entanglement of government in social and economic issues and its vested interests aggravate social conflict and bring the political system directly into the conflict, hence the radicalization of protest. For example the anti-corruption protest in Wukan brought down a corrupt local government and resulted in the successful establishment of an autonomous governing body exercising political power independent of the Party; in the environmental protests in Chinese cities, residents went beyond the immediate issues and demanded the right to know, to express, to be heard and to participate; and on Guangdong's factory floors, workers have demanded not only higher pay and better working conditions, but also the right to vote for their own union members and the right to bargain as a collective body. Dissidence may be permeating into socio-economic issues and ordinary citizens are more politically informed and engaged. Many have observed a gradual convergence between the traditional regime change activities and the new generation of rights protection activities, with both aiming at political change through legal action and civil society mobilization.
In the age of rights, political dissidents and rights advocates are no longer distinct. The budget for internal security in 2010 was RMB 514 billion, an 8.9 per cent increase from 2009.
The budget for national defense was RMB 518.6 billion for the same year. It has become a controversial issue how much China spends on domestic security or whether China spends more on internal security than national defense. But it is beyond doubt that China is spending a much larger budget on internal security than ever before: Lu, above n 7, 549. designed to punish political enemies who allegedly opposed the regime. 16 Traditionally, the Communist regime in China created its own enemies and its political control in the first thirty years of the Peoples' Republic relied on a clear distinction between the 'people'
and their 'enemy'. The key feature of the class enemy was that once the status was ascribed and the enemy so labeled, it became inherent and permanent. 17 The class enemy was totalistic in that the concept opposed the pure 'we' to the evil 'they', claiming that whoever was not with us was against us. Once attached, the label became a 'master status'
and represented the 'total personality' of those who held it. When the dualism of enemy versus people applied, the system designed a dual mechanism to deal with enemy and people separately and differently. Harsh measures were applied to enemies and more moderate measures were applied to deal with conflicts among the people.
There was then the decisive change from revolution to modernization in the late 1970s. In response to the larger political change, China has embarked on a course of depoliticizing control through a three-stage process. First, the concept of crime has been depoliticized and is seen principally through a legal lens as a violation of law. Crime was traditionally given a highly political definition, not so much as a violation of law but as a challenge to the political system. Depoliticized crime was alien to a socialist state because the causes of crime no longer existed in a socialist state. In this circular reasoning, the 'people' would not commit crimes against the state and so those who committed crime against the state must be the enemy of the people. Crime was used more as a tool for political repression than a legal instrument for social regulation, and as such it was poorly and broadly defined, if at all. The enactment of the 1979 Criminal Law was a milestone in bringing the law back to defining and punishing crime. Even the legalization of counterrevolution offence in the 1979 Criminal Law, a highly politicized law, was hailed, rightly so, as progress from the wanton political persecution in the previous decades, and was the first step toward bringing some legal certainty and regularity in this sensitive area.
18
Counterrevolution was defined as an act 'endangering the People's Republic of China committed with the purpose of overthrowing the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system'. Counterrevolutionary offences included three broad categories of crime. The first category was offences against state security including treason, espionage, subversion and other traditional crimes against the state. The second category related to three broadly based 'thought crimes' including the crime of organizing counterrevolutionary groups; using feudal superstition to carry out counterrevolutionary purpose;
and counterrevolutionary propaganda. And the third category included ordinary criminal offences committed with a political purpose such as sabotaging with a political purpose motivation. The element of Secondly, the depoliticization of crime took place in the context of enhanced political tolerance. The Party in the reform era was characterized by consultative authoritarianism and pluralistic authoritarianism, and was more tolerant of different and critical voices.
The promulgation of the 1979 Criminal Law witnessed a sharp decline of political offences in both the actual number and in its percentage in the overall criminal offences.
There are many reasons that explain the decline, including a less political population and the creation of channels, such as litigation, effectively to divert and absorb political challenges. But a significant reason is that the Party had shifted its priority to economic growth and become more tolerant of political dissent. Correspondingly, legal institutions were forced to respond to the social changes. For example, the police were forced to tone down political rhetoric on the class enemy and class struggle and to make its priority the policing of surging street crime, to serve the economy. In turn, the courts had to divert resources to deal with the increase in civil and economic disputes.
Finally, the depoliticization of crime was followed by an equally important reform to depoliticize criminal law. The abolition of counterrevolutionary offences in criminal law reflected a political reality that the distinction between the people and their enemy could not be maintained. In the age of social and economic transformation, the 'enemies', having toned down their rhetoric and taken off their uniforms, are diversifying their Political trials remain. In subversion trials, for instance, incitement-based charges often resemble the old counterrevolutionary offences and punish mere thoughts and speech.
The ghost of the class enemy haunts political trials, and once a dissident label becomes attached, the stigma stays and one's activity is interpreted through that political lens.
When that happens, the question 'who he is' often becomes the decisive element of a crime, and as happened in Liu Xiaobo's trial, criminal law goes beyond the mens rea and actus reus in allocating liability, to include the total circumstances of the case including the accused's record and motivation. 15 forum in which a large audience was invited to witness and experience the majesty of the state power and participate in the ritualistic process. The 'public trial' was used to demonstrate that the state was mighty but also right, and the moral submission of the enemy to the authority of the state was a necessity. Therefore, confession from the enemy, chanting of slogans, and parading of offenders through the streets were integral parts of the legal process. In that Durkheimian process, the Party crystallized the boundary between the people and their enemy and strengthened the solidarity among the people.
The class struggle generated solidarity among the people in which the righteous people identified themselves as the moral majority against the morally inferior enemy. In the process, the enemy was used as a measure against which the boundary between virtual and evil, normal and abnormal and people and enemy was defined and re-defined.
Contemporary dissident trials no longer have the same education function and expressive value. As mentioned above, the number of political trials has significantly reduced and when they take place, they are conducted in great secrecy, hidden from any public purview. The invisibility is in part the result of the growing legal professionalism and institutionalization. For example, the Supreme People's Court has effectively banned any form of parading of offenders during or after trials. But the decision to keep the public out in political trials goes beyond the concern of an enhanced professionalism and civility.
The Party is aware of the possibility that a political trial is likely to reduce rather than enhance its credibility and the trial of dissidents, if not managed well, may become a trial of the regime itself. The defendants were no longer the class enemies who were overwhelmed by a powerful and righteous state. The current dissidents represent and 16 speak for a larger social force composed of real people with diverse interest, and behind every dissident on trial there is a support group who is willing to stand up and continue with the resistance. The prosecution is an intervention into an on-going process of social resistance, which is unlikely to stop merely because of a prosecution. On the contrary, the prosecution may serve as a catalyst for further mobilization.
As a result, the Party has developed alternative strategies to punish dissidents without Given the pragmatic objective of achieving control with minimum cost, high rhetoric has become marginal. Ritualistic trials, while continuing to exist to serve an incapacitation purpose, are no longer central to stability maintenance. Law has gradually lost its expressive utility and educational value. China is no longer a purely ideological state and what is important is to control the risk and compromise challenges in a quiet and 17 effective way. From an efficiency perspective, political trial is a waste of resources and attracts unnecessary attention when other more cost-effective tools are available.
ADMINISTRATIVE ABSORPTION OF POLITICAL CHALLENGES
With the depolicitization and a non-ideological approach, the Party designs a comprehensive political-administrative strategy to absorb and capture the political challenges under various political labels such as harmonious society, stability maintenance or social management. Subsequent punishment through political trials has been replaced by surveillance and preventative and proactive intervention by security agencies; deterrence and suppression has been replaced by a strategy of control through social management and containment. Well-resourced security agencies respond to potential threats aggressively before they mature.
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The control mechanism is administrative in nature and largely bypasses the formal legal process. As practiced in China, these mechanisms are less visible, informal and operate on a case-by-case basis with an objective to preempt risk factors that may disturb stability and prevent the ferment of any collective action. In essence, the newly depoliticized 
Surveillance Society
The most visible sign of a changing strategy is the enhanced external control. The Party has resorted to technology to enhance its monitoring capacity in both the virtual and real worlds. In a society characterized by increasing individualization, high levels of mobility and enhanced levels of social and economic freedom, relying on external control becomes essential. Indeed, Chinese cities are now among the most watched in the world, and virtually every Chinese city is abundantly covered by CCTV. 25 Take Guangdong province for example, which has about a million CCTV cameras and is planning to spend nearly US$2 billion to install another million in the near future. Tanner, above n 5.
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The broadening of political control, the frequent encounters with the security apparatus on regular social and economic issues, and the inclusion of some of the social elites in the control net, all contribute to the reduction of fear among those at the receiving end. It desensitizes the issue and reduces the authority of the security apparatus. Traditionally, an interview with the security organ was regarded as a serious political matter and a threat of it would strike sufficient fear as to secure compliance. Once the veil of secrecy is pierced through, the level of fear diminishes substantially.
Preemption and Disaggregation
Facing the diversified and persistent challenges that are politicizing, the Party has designed multiple preemptive mechanisms to prevent any aggregate effect. A key strategy of general intervention is the promotion of aggressive mediation and the imposition of a duty on all government departments to end disputes proactively as quickly as they occur. Courts in particular are encouraged to mobilize available resources to bring conflicts to an effective end at any cost. The interventionist and proactive style of dispute resolution aims at preventing conflicts from foaming, escalating and solidifying, regardless of their political orientations.
Reflecting the larger trend of depoliticization, the Party is no longer defending any ideological claims or proving the legitimacy of certain political doctrines. It is taking a pragmatic approach in identifying and classifying potential threats assorted by levels of 23 dangerousness, taking preemptive measures and removing any risk factors. The Party is no longer interested in mere ideological differences and the focus has decisively shifted to the likely social impact of certain courses of action rather than the ideological background that may motivate and inform the action.
The Party now tolerates challenging political rhetoric including even some extreme, but harmless, language used against the Party. It is not punishing speech per se but carefully assessing its impact. As King, Pan and Roberts have shown, mere online criticisms, as 'vitriolic' as they are, are not the primary target of Chinese censorship. It is postings that are likely to spur collective action that attract the wrath of China's censors.
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Indeed, even statements that are in support of the regime get censored. The test is not the political correctness of the speech but the possibility to ignite a collective action. In that sense, the suppression is 'politically neutral': the security apparatus pays little attention to the political views of its targets and is reluctant to engage in discussion on value questions including questions relating to the legality of certain policies or the legitimacy of the Party. The concern is merely pragmatic. One's ideological orientation and the long term value of activities are of little concern now, and the only issue is whether the course of action, if left unchecked, would produce some significant unstable factors. The focus of the control is often on the prevention and control of collective conflict, or mass event, defined as a dispute involving a certain number of people. Collective dispute, as mentioned above, often relates to a government department and is prone to collective action and street protest, as such, is given high political attention and treated with great care.
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Even when individual grievances are coalescing into a broader and sustained protest, the Party still tolerates the disturbance and refrains itself from violent clamping down while trying to defuse the issues and prevent further escalation. In general, it is commonly observed that the Party has become more tolerant of (potentially politicized) protest and accommodative of protesters' demands. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the Party relies on protest to solve its agency problem and it is not the suppression of protest but the tolerance of it that has contributed to the Party's stability. The government is accommodative and the police are strictly prohibited from using weapons or police devices in policing protests. 34 By and large, the government has been able to bring protests to a speedy end and avoid the backfiring that is associated with repression. The system now responds rapidly and is willing to compromise, even though the accommodative policies may have been seen as an incentive for more protests.
Extreme Measures
Reliance on preemptive measures does not necessarily mean the authoritarianism has become kinder or gentler. The containment strategy does not necessarily reduce the level of repression; it equalizes it in the sense that, through the preemptive strategy, violence is spreading from the dark corner of an interrogation room to the larger society. As Party is willing to reflex its authoritarian muscles when facing a crisis, perceived or real, and is decisive in abandoning legal rules and operating outside the legal framework.
Eventually, when a real emergency is perceived, the Party draws a line in the sand to separate the enemy from the people even though the line is arbitrary and endogenous.
Depoliticized control is prone to degenerate into one without any moral principle, and amoral control sees no bottom lines in designing control strategies. Law is defined here as a constitutional legal regime in which properly constituted authorities make and state legal norms (in a legal format) which are subsequently applied fairly by independent tribunals.
There is a credible process of legal representation and judicial deliberation and a degree of transparency, and external accountability throughout the decision-making process. Extra-law is defined as an official comprises government measures that exist in some dark space, seemingly unrelated to any legal framework and devoid of any legal authority. It is an informal political institution characterized by a total lack of legality. It is used to advance some predatory and repressive government policies which cannot be justified by any law or extra-law. As such, extra-extra law is covered in secrecy and operates with no legal accountability.
Except occasional and indirect admissions, such as the quasi-official admission of the existence of 'black jails' for petitioners, it does not officially exist, and, as such, it survives and thrives because it is effective in achieving certain policy goals which cannot otherwise be achieved through law or extra-law. The legal or even the extra-legal system is regarded as weak and ineffective when it comes to sensitive issues. In these situations, intimidation through extra-extra law becomes expedient and even indispensible.
There is a fundamental difference between enforced disappearance (extra-extra law) and abuse of criminal procedure (law). When the government uses, or even abuses the law, it still signals a commitment to law and a degree of fidelity to legal rules. There is also a degree of legal accountability and responsibility. That explains why human rights lawyers and others who were kidnapped may have demanded their day in court -so that abuses could be brought to the attention of the law and public scrutiny. The mere trappings of legality may not be sufficient to convert a political persecution into a fair legal process, but it is a necessary first step in developing the rule of law.
system in which power is neither directly derived from properly constituted authorities nor subject to independent oversight (judicial or otherwise). It has a strong political or policy orientation and the whole system is largely geared to political expediency or convenience: Fu H, 'Varieties of law in China ' (2011) 12 China Rights Forum <http://www.hrichina.org/crf/article/5422> (accessed February 2013).
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What distinguishes the most recent repressive episode from the previous ones may be the potential to institutionalize extra-extra law and a strong sense of entitlement and confidence in using those extraordinary measures. China is gaining impressive economic power under the Party's leadership and the Party has become more confident in its legitimacy and ability to rule in its own way. At the same time, the Party is facing unprecedented social, economic and, to a lesser degree, political challenges. It feels its vulnerability strongly. But law is not currently perceived to be the most effective tool to handle the emerging crisis.
CONCLUSION
The Chinese Party-state faces diversified political challenges, including the boundary change and regime change challenges and those posed by growing social and economic issues. A defining characteristic of those resilient and well-organized challenges is their express political agenda. Ultimately, the Chinese political system, that is, the monopoly of power by the Party, is perceived as the root cause of all social ills, and the reform of that system or an outright regime change is often taken as a necessary pre-condition of or even the first step to meaningful reform. This is a legitimacy crisis that a democracy does not face and presents a unique set of difficulties for the Party.
In response, the Party has depoliticized crime, criminal law and political control strategies by declaring the end of class struggle and abandoning the rhetoric of 29 counterrevolutionary crime. It has also minimized the use of political trials and resorted to the ordinary criminal law to punish politically-motivated challenges. At the same time, the Party has enhanced its capacity for external monitoring and surveillance and has invested in social management so as to preempt, capture and divert the growing social and political tension.
The difference between democracies and authoritarian states may not mainly lie with the threats that both face but their reactions to them. In a globalized world, risk is globalized and all states face grave challenges to their respective political structures. However, 
